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#2A-12/22/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, 
Respondent, 
-and-
THOMAS C. BARRY. 
Charging Party. 
BERNARD ASHE. ESQ. (IVOR MOSKOWITZ. ESQ.. of Counsel), 
for Respondent 
THOMAS C. BARRY. p_ro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
) 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Professor 
Thomas C. Barry (Barry) to the decision of the Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing his charge against the United 
University Professions (UUP) on the ground that Barry has 
failed and refused to submit in verified form an amendment to 
his charge containing an allegation of fact which is 
necessary to establish his standing to bring the charge. 
In its answer and at the pre-hearing conference UUP 
noted that Barry had failed to plead that he was an agency 
fee payer at all times relevant to the charge. The ALJ 
directed Barry to submit an affidavit "indicating his status 
as agency fee payer for the year in question." Barry 
responded that he would not submit any verified statement and 
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that he gives his "word of honor" that he has been "at all 
times relevant to this I.P. an independent employee forced by 
the State to give money to the UUP and its affiliates." The 
ALJ subsequently wrote to Barry indicating that, if a 
verified response to his letter was not received, he would 
recommend that the matter be dismissed. Barry thereafter 
reiterated that he would not submit a verified statement and 
that his "word of honor" should be accepted. 
The ALJ dismissed the charge on the ground that it lacks 
the necessary pleading of standing to file the charge. The 
ALJ expressed the view that Barry's refusal to plead such 
allegation in the proper form evidences an unwillingness to 
proceed except under conditions dictated by him and 
demonstrates his refusal to cooperate in the processing of 
his charge. 
In his exceptions, Barry objects to referring to himself 
as an "agency fee payer". He also reiterates his view that 
we should accept any correction in his pleadings by a letter 
subscribed by his signature in which he gives his word as to 
the truth of statements in the letter. UUP has filed no 
response-to Barry's exceptions. 
DISCUSSION 
We affirm the decision of the ALJ. In doing so we 
distinguish between Barry's objection to the use of any 
particular language formula in alleging facts establishing 
his standing to file the charge herein, and his objection to 
10726 
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alleging those facts in verified form. While the former 
raises no problem under our Rules of Procedure, the latter 
does. 
Section 204.1(a)(3) of our Rules of Procedure states: 
The charge shall be in writing on a form 
prescribed by the Director and shall be 
signed and sworn to before any person 
authorized to administer oaths. 
It may be noted that the charge filed by Barry in this case 
complied with that requirement in that it was signed by him 
and sworn to before a notary public. We agree with the ALJ 
that any amendment to an improper practice charge must also 
comply with that provision of our Rules. 
Barry was advised that his charge was deficient in that 
it failed to allege any facts which established his standing 
to challenge the agency shop fee refund procedures 
established by UUP for the year in question. When this 
deficiency was called to his attention it would have been a 
simple matter to amend his charge in accordance with our 
Rules. The ALJ's request for a statement as to his "status 
as an agency fee payer" did not require him to use that 
specific language. Any allegation of fact establishing his 
right to challenge UUP's procedures during the relevant year 
would have been sufficient. The ALJ's letters and decision 
indicate that the charge was dismissed not because of the 
contents of Barry's statement but because the statement was 
not verified as required by our Rules. 
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It is clear that Barry has deliberately refused to 
submit his statement in verified form. Our Rules require 
that all allegations of a charge be sworn to. We find that 
Barry has failed to submit a necessary allegation in verified 
form and that his charge is deficient. Accordingly, we 
affirm the ALJ ' s dismissal of the charge. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be. and 
it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: December 22. 1986 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 







MIDDLE COUNTRY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION. 
Intervenor. 
RAINS & POGREBIN. P.C. (ERNEST R. STOLZER. ESQ.. and 
HARRIET A. GILLIAM, ESQ. of Counsel), for Respondent 
JOSEPH WERNER. p_ro se 
RICHARD J. BARON, for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Joseph 
Werner (Werner) to the decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) dismissing in its entirety his charge that the 
Middle Country Central School District (District) violated 
§209-a.I(a) of the Act when it placed a written reprimand 
in his personnel file after an incident at a" faculty 
meeting held on January 22, 1985. The Middle Country 
Teachers Association (Association) was permitted to 
intervene in this proceeding. 
Board - U-8139 -2 
FACTS 
On January 22, 1985, a faculty meeting was conducted 
by Laura Spagnolo, principal of the District's Centereach 
High School. Werner, a teacher at that school, attended 
the meeting. The testimony of the witnesses conflicted 
regarding what actually occurred at the meeting. The ALJ 
credited the testimony of Spagnolo, Russo and Brosdal and 
did not credit the testimony of Werner and Vessichio. 
Based on the testimony credited by the ALJ, the following 
took place. The meeting lasted about an hour. 
Approximately halfway through the meeting. Brosdal was 
recognized by Spagnolo and spoke in support of a candidate 
) running for an Association office. 
Toward the end of the meeting, and independent of the 
Brosdal presentation, Russo, a teacher and Association 
officer, was recognized by Spagnolo to speak. He began to 
inform those at the meeting that an Association meeting 
would follow the faculty meeting. Werner stood up and 
interrupted him, asking Spagnolo if the faculty meeting was 
now over. Russo responded. Werner took exception to 
Russo's response and the two exchanged words. Spagnolo 
could not hear the specific words of the argument between 
the two but she was concerned about the interruption of the 
meeting. Spagnolo twice directed both men to be quiet. 
Russo obeyed the second direction but Werner continued to 
stand and speak. Spagnolo shouted at Werner to sit down. 
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He then complied. Spagnolo addressed a guidance issue, the 
last item on the agenda, and then adjourned the meeting and 
left the room. 
In a memorandum to Werner, dated January 28, 1985, 
Spagnolo wrote: 
This is to inform you that I found your 
conduct at our faculty meeting of January 
22. 1985, less than professional. I am 
certain that you will agree that calling 
out and making statements without proper 
recognition from the one conducting a 
meeting is inappropriate. 
I am hopeful that you will not have to be 
reminded again of proper conduct at a 
professional meeting. 
This memorandum was placed in Werner's personnel file 
) in Spagnolo's office. 
In support of his claim that this memorandum was 
motivated by District animus toward him because of his long 
standing anti-Association beliefs and activities, Werner 
relied on several past incidents. These included 1} a 1984 
order to remove a sign that Werner had placed in the 
teachers' lounge dealing with a pending disciplinary 
proceeding against another teacher, 2) a 1982 direction to 
sign in when he visits other schools, and 3) a past failure 
to respond to a grievance he filed regarding the 
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ALJ DECISION 
Based upon her credibility determinations, the ALJ 
dismissed the charge in its entirety. She found that Spagnolo 
did not hear what Werner said and was angry only because of his 
interruption of a recognized speaker. She found that the 
contents of the memorandum support the conclusion that Spagnolo 
acted only because of the interruption and not because Werner 
was objecting to Russo's announcement of an Association 
meeting. She also found that the past incidents revealed by 
the evidence did not establish any animus against Werner 
because of his anti-Association beliefs and activities. In 
particular, no such hostility was shown to exist on the part of 
) Spagnolo. She found that the memorandum did not constitute an 
interference with the right of Werner not to participate in 
union activities. She found that the mere fact that Werner had 
to hear Russo's announcement of the Association meeting did not 
constitute participation by Werner in Association activities 
any more than would the use of mailboxes or bulletin boards to 
make such announcements. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In his exceptions, Werner claims that he was denied a fair 
hearing by virtue of rulings made by the ALJ concerning the 
manner of his presentation and the content of his testimony. 
He objects to the ALJ's credibility determinations. He alleges 
that the ALJ erred in not finding a pattern of discrimination 
by the District against him. 
Board - U-8139 
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The District responds that the ALJ's disposition of the 
charge is fully supported by the record. It urges that the ALJ 
properly credited the testimony of Brosdal, Russo and 
Spagnolo. It also contends that Werner was not denied a fair 
hearing. 
DISCUSSION 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law of the ALJ. 
Werner assumed the dual role of advocate and witness. The 
ALJ properly ruled on objections to certain portions of his 
testimony. The record reveals also that the ALJ accommodated 
Werner by permitting him ultimately to testify from the 
counsel's table after he complained that he could not make 
adequate use of his notes while testifying from the witness 
chair. Accordingly, any problem relating to the organization 
of his presentation was of his own making and was not due to 
the rulings of the ALJ. 
We agree with the credibility determinations made by the 
ALJ. To the extent that they can be tested by the objective 
evidence, they are supported by the record. To the extent that 
they turn on the demeanor of the witnesses, we rely upon the 
ALJ's judgment.— 
1/Fashion Institute of Technology v. Helsby. 44 AD 2d 
550. 7 PERB 1[7005 (1st Dep • t 1974). 
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We conclude that Spagnolo's memorandum of January 28 
was not in retaliation for Werner having engaged in activity 
protected by the Act. We agree with the ALJ that the record 
does not establish a pattern of discrimination by the 
District based on Werner's anti-Association beliefs and 
activities . Accordingly, weT determineT that the District dicT 
not violate §209-a.l(a) of the Act. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: December 22. 1986 
Albany. New York 
W734 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WAVERLY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and- '_ CASE NO. U-8 512 
WAVERLY ASSOCIATION OF SUPPORT 
PERSONNEL, NEA, 
Charging Party. 
R. WHITNEY MITCHELL, for Respondent 
JOHN B. SCHAMEL, for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
') 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Waverly 
Association of Support Personnel, NEA (WASP) to a portion of 
the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in this 
matter. The ALJ found that the Waverly Central School 
District (District) had violated §209-a.1(a) and (c) of the 
Act when it failed to pay a wage increase in September 1985 
to certain teacher aides employed by the District. Based 
upon the agreement of WASP that a subseguent collective 
bargaining agreement made a back pay award unnecessary, the 
ALJ did not award back pay nor did he award interest. The 
only issue raised by WASP in its exceptions is the propriety 
of not awarding interest to the affected employees. 
10735 
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FACTS 
The teacher aides were unrepresented until May 15, 1985, 
when the District recognized WASP as their negotiating 
agent. It appears that prior to such recognition, the 
District had given the teacher aides a 30 cent an hour wage 
increase at the beginning of each school year since 1981-82. 
However, in September 1985, after recognition of WASP as 
their agent, the District did not grant any wage increase to 
the teacher aides. 
The ALJ found that the District's failure to pay the 30 
cent per hour increase violated §209-a.l(a) and (c). The ALJ 
dismissed the allegation that the District's conduct also 
) violated §209-a.l(d). 
Insofar as the remedy was concerned, the ALJ noted that 
the parties had reached an agreement after negotiations which 
provided for a 7 percent salary increase to the bargaining 
unit members, including the teacher aides, retroactive to 
July 1, 1985. He also noted that in its brief to him. WASP 
stated that "there is no need for a back pay award on salary 
since the payment on August 28. 1986 will make whole the 
employees according to the terms of the collective bargaining 
agreement." On that basis, he found that no back pay award 
was warranted. He rejected WASP'S claim that interest on the 
withheld money should, nevertheless, be paid. He stated that 
since no money was owed, no interest was due. In his view.' 
— < • 
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to order payment of interest under these circumstances would 
constitute a penalty.— 
DISCUSSION 
WASP urges that we should award interest on the money 
withheld from September 1985 to August 28, 1986. To the 
extent that WASP argues that, notwithstanding its concession 
that no back pay award is warranted by virtue of the 
retroactive 7 percent increase under the collective 
bargaining agreement, interest should be given in any event, 
the answer to such a contention is clear. If no back pay is 
granted, there can be no interest awarded. We agree with the 
ALJ that no interest can be due on money which is not owed. 
In addition, WASP contends that, notwithstanding its 
concession that the employees have been made whole by the 
terms of the collective bargaining agreement, the violation 
of §209-a.l{a) and (c) should be remedied. It urges that 
while no back pay need be awarded, such remedy should be the 
interest computed on the money that was withheld. 
There are at least three answers to such a contention. 
First, the appropriate remedy for the violation found by the 
ALJ would ordinarily be a back pay award. A back pay remedy. 
i/The District has not filed any exceptions to the 
ALJ's decision. The only guestion raised by WASP'S 
exceptions relates to the matter of the interest. No other 
aspect of the ALJ's decision, therefore, is before us. 
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however, is not appropriate because it has been agreed that 
the collective bargaining agreement made the affected 
employees whole. There is no basis for an award of money 
that goes beyond making an injured party whole because the 
2/ Taylor Law precludes exemplary damages.— 
Second, WASP'S argument amounts to a contention that in 
fact the employees were not made whole, but suffered 
unreimbursed damages by virtue of the loss of the interest on 
the money they would have received during the year. The 
record reveals that 3 of the 5 aides received an increase in 
excess of 30 cents per hour by virtue of the 7 percent 
increase. Thus, an order awarding additional money to all of 
the affected employees measured by the legal rate of interest 
on 30 cents per hour would result not in a make-whole remedy, 
but in a windfall for some of the employees. Under these 
circumstances, we find that the remedy requested by WASP 
would not effectuate the purposes of the Act. 
Third, the ALJ has ordered an appropriate remedy for the 
violation that he found. He ordered the District to post a 
notice advising unit employees that it would not repeat the 
conduct found to be improper. 
•^ -/civil Service Law, Section 205.5(d). 
Board - U-8512 
Accordingly, we dismiss its exceptions 
DATED: December 22, 1986 
Albany, New York 
3/ 
/ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb/er 
3/lnasmuch as the District has 
to the ALJ's decision and order, i 
that it is required to comply with 
which directs the District to ceas 
interfering with, restraining, coe 
against unit employees because of 
rights protected under the Act and 
notice attached to his decision at 
customarily used to post communica 
not filed exceptions 
t should be understood 
the order of the ALJ 
e and desist from 
rcing or discriminating 
the exercise of any 
to sign and post the 
all locations 
tions to unit members. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF ROCHESTER, 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8540 
AFSCME, COUNCIL 66. LOCAL 1635. 
Charging Party. 
LOUIS N. KASH. ESQ.. CORPORATION COUNSEL 
(BARRY C. WATKINS, ESQ.. of Counsel), for Respondent 
JOEL M. POCH, ESQ., for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of AFSCME, 
Council 66, Local 1635 (AFSCME) to that part of the decision 
of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) which found that the 
City of Rochester (City) did not violate §209-a.l(a) and (c) 
of the Act when it conditioned Brian Woods' promotion to a 
bargaining unit position on his agreement to resign from his 
union office. The ALJ also found that the City did violate 
the Act by conditioning the promotion on Woods' agreement not 
to accept certain union offices for two years. The City has 
not filed any exceptions. In response to AFSCME's 
exceptions, it takes the position that the ALJ's decision is 
a proper one under the circumstances. 
10740 
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FACTS 
Woods has been employed by the City as a recreation 
supervisor since 1973. He was elected to the union office of 
recreation unit chairman in 1976. Since 1979, he has availed 
himself of full release time from his job pursuant to the 
terms of the parties' collective bargaining agreement, which 
grants such full release time to, among others, the recreation 
unit chairman. 
In 1985, vacancies occurred for the position of "center 
director", a bargaining unit position. Woods indicated 
interest and was interviewed. He was recommended for 
appointment, subject, however, to certain conditions set forth 
in a memorandum delivered to Woods. In summary, these 
conditions required Woods 1) to resign as recreation unit 
chairman and relinquish all rights to full release time, and 
2) not to accept any position in the union which makes the 
incumbent eligible for full release time for a period of two 
years. 
Woods refused to agree to these conditions. The position 
of center director was not offered to him. The instant charge 
ensued. 
Woods testified that he did not intend to perform the 
duties of center director if appointed, since he would 
continue in full release time as the unit chairman. The City 
witnesses testified that they did not promote Woods because he 
would not be available to perform the duties of the position. 
10741' 
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The City conceded that any center director who was 
elected to a union position with full release time could not 
be precluded from taking such full release time. The City 
contended, however, that although the contract required 
granting full release time to a center director who is 
elected after appointment, the City was not required to 
promote someone while on full release time. 
ALJ DECISION 
The ALJ found that the record did not support the 
allegation of AFSCME that Woods was denied the promotion 
because of specific management hostility towards him by 
reason of his union activities. She found that the reasons 
) given by the City witnesses for not promoting him were not 
pretextual. They did not promote him, she found, solely 
because Woods would not be available to perform the duties of 
the position. 
She also considered whether the conditions, 
nevertheless, violated the Act. She held that the conditions 
in the memorandum should be considered separately. As to the 
first condition, she said that requiring someone to resign a 
union position as a condition to promotion would ordinarily 
be violative of the Act, but in this case the concern of the 
City was not the union position but the full release time. 
She also found that the City did not discriminate based on 
the union position nor was Woods treated any differently from 
other candidates for the promotion since the same condition 
10742 
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would be applicable to any other candidate who had full 
release time. 
She found the second condition, however, to be too 
broad. Although she recognized that this was an attempt to 
take care of the problem of a "sham resignation" by Woods, 
she held^that the City7 "couldnot7 bar "someone" from the 
exercise of union rights for two years. 
Thus, the ALJ determined that the City could require 
Woods to resign from his position as a condition for 
promotion but that the City's attempt to assure that he not 
return to his union position for two years is violative of 
the Act. 
EXCEPTIONS 
AFSCME asserts that the ALJ's fundamental error was to 
bifurcate the memorandum. In its view, the memorandum 
contained only one condition; promotion was offered subject 
to accepting it in its entirety. It argues that bifurcating 
that condition results in an illogical decision. The Board 
should find that the entire memo was improper, since an 
employer cannot require resignation from a union position as 
a condition of promotion. AFSCME also argues that it was 
error for the ALJ to find that the stated reasons for denial 
of promotion were not pretextual. 
In its response, the City urges that the ALJ's decision 
should be affirmed. In its view, she correctly analyzed the 
10743 
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two conditions. It notes, however, that the ALJ decision is 
not clear as to what could be done to avoid a sham 
resignation. It requests that we clarify this matter. 
DISCUSSION 
Based on our review of the record, we agree with the 
ALJ that the City did not take the action complained of 
because of hostility towards Woods due to his union 
activities, or from any desire to retaliate against him for 
exercising a contractual right. We also agree with the ALJ 
that the record evidence does not support a finding that the 
City's stated reasons for its actions are pretextual. We 
find that in imposing the complained of conditions for 
Woods' promotion, the City was motivated by a concern that 
it promote someone who was actually going to perform the 
duties of the job. 
Nevertheless, we find that the conditions imposed in 
furtherance of its proper concern violated §209-a.l(a) and 
(c) of the Act. We conclude that while the City could deny 
promotion to Woods because he was not prepared to perform 
the duties of the job, it could not require him to resign 
from his union office as a condition of the promotion. 
A public employer undoubtedly has the right to deny a 
promotion to an employee who, for whatever reason, will not 
be available to perform the duties of the job. Whether the 
reason be full release time, sabbatical leave, educational 
leave or other long-term leave, a public employer may 
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require that the employee give assurance of availability to 
perform the duties of the job as a condition for promotion. 
On the other hand, a public employer may not require an 
employee to relinquish a union position as a condition of 
promotion to a bargaining unit position. In the case before 
us, this condition, as specified by the employer, 
r
 constitutes an unlawful intrusion into the public employee's 
protected rights. 
The ALJ concluded that the union position and the full 
release time benefit were so interrelated that the City's 
concern that Woods be available to perform the duties of the 
job justified the condition that Woods resign his union 
position. It is our view, however, that the union position 
and the full release time benefit are not so inseparable 
that the City could not have dealt directly with its concern 
over Wood's availability. 
There is no statutory right to full release time. 
Unless agreed to by the employer, no union officer has such 
a right. The benefit was available here only by virtue of 
the parties' collective bargaining agreement. Like other 
negotiated leave benefits, the employees eligible for them 
may utilize them or not, at their option. It is not 
unreasonable to require an employee who desires a promotion 
to make a choice between taking extended time off pursuant 
to a contractually afforded opportunity to do so, and making 
himself available to perform the job that he is seeking. It 
10745 
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is irrelevant whether the extended time off is for full 
release time, sabbatical leave or any other contractually 
afforded benefit. What matters only is whether the employee 
chooses to make himself unavailable to perform the job he 
seeks. 
If, as in this case, the employee chooses to avail 
himself of full release time and not give the employer 
assurance of his availability for some reasonable period for 
the job to which he wishes to be promoted, the employer may, 
without violating the Act, refuse to offer the 
promotion.— This remains so even if the employee 
believes that he must avail himself of the full release time 
in order to perform his union duties properly. If that is 
the case, the employee must chose between the reasonable 
requirements of the position he seeks and those of his union 
position. Moreover, just as it is an internal union matter 
to determine whether he devotes sufficient time to his union 
duties, it is a management prerogative to determine whether 
he devotes sufficient time to the promotional position which 
he has sought. 
i^ See. Environmental Protection Administration of the 
City of Mew York, 9 PERB 1f3066 (1976). Of course, this is 
based upon the conclusion that the requirement of avail-
ability is a real one, and not a pretext for interfering 
with the employee's right to perform a union office. 
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We conclude, therefore, that the City could require 
Woods to give up full release time as a condition of 
promotion but it could not require his resignation from the 
union position. Accordingly, we modify the ALJ's 
determination and find that the City violated §209-a.l(a) 
and (c) of the Act by conditioning Woods' promotion to a 
bargaining unit position on his agreement to resign from his 
union position. * 
Since neither party challenges the ALJ's finding that 
the City violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act by 
conditioning Woods' promotion on his agreement that he would 
not accept any union position eligible for full release 
time for two years, we do not consider this aspect of the 
case. We would note, however, that if pursuant to the 
remedial order herein. Woods should accept the promotion 
offered on the basis of the condition which we have found 
the City could properly impose, the parties' subsequent 
handling of this matter would be governed by considerations 
other than those related to promotional standards, such as 
their respective rights and obligations under the Civil 
Service Law and their collective bargaining agreement, as 
well as applicable provisions of the Taylor Law. It is not 
possible for us to speculate as to the ongoing rights and 
obligations of the parties if Woods should be promoted. 
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NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the City: 
1. Cease and desist from requiring Brian Woods to 
resign his position as Chairman of the Recreation 
Unit, Local 1635 and to refrain from holding such 
position for two years as a condition of promotion; 
2~n5ake~The Center"~Director~i~s"Job available to Brian 
Woods without the conditions found unlawful herein; 
3. Cease and desist from interfering with, restraining, 
coercing or discriminating against Brian Woods or 
any other un.it employee in the exercise of rights 
protected by the Act; and 
4. Sign and conspicuously post a notice in the form 
attached at all locations ordinarily used to 
communicate information to all unit employees. 
DATED: December 22, 1986 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 
,/A^»~<. (r^C 
Jerome Lefkowity, Mem.be 
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APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify employees of the City of Rochester within the unit represented by 
AFSCME, Council 66, Local 1635 that: 
1. We will not require Brian Woods to resign his position as Chairman 
of the Recreation Unit, Local 1635 and to refrain from holding 
such position for two years as a condition of promotion; 
2. We will make the Center Director's job available to Brian Woods 
without the conditions found unlawful. 
3. We will not interfere with, restrain, coerce or discriminate against 
Brian Woods or any other unit employee in the exercise of rights 
protected by the Act. 
.City. of. Rochester. 
uaiea. By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and [must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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#2E-12/22/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SCHOOL DISTRICT EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 
COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SYRACUSE 
for a determination pursuant to 
Section 212 of the Civil Service Law. 
CASE NO. S-003 9 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
In its Decision and Order dated November 28, 1986, this 
Board concluded in part: 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the determination 
of this Board dated February 8, 
1968,2/ approving the 
enactment establishing the 
Syracuse School District local 
PERB be, and the same hereby 
is, suspended, subject to 
reinstatement upon application 
and demonstration by the 
Syracuse School District local 
PERB that the continuing 
implementation of its local 
provisions and procedures is 
substantially equivalent to 
those governing this Board; 
2/1 PERB 1f344. 
The order also indicated that unless the application for 
reinstatement was filed by December 22, 1986, our 
determination of February 8, 1968 would be rescinded without 
further notice. 
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The current Counsel for the School District Employment 
Relations Council of the City of Syracuse, by letter dated 
December 5. 1986, asserts that the local PERB is in full 
compliance and requests reinstatement of our determination 
dated February 8, 1968. The letter was accompanied by our 
survey q^iesTTilmnaTre. none "or"-wfiose responses raises airy 
issue as to the substantial equivalency of the local 
provisions and procedures or their continuing implementation. 
ACCORDINGLY, WE ORDER that the determination of this 
Board dated February 8, 1968, approving the 
enactment establishing a local PERB for the 
School District Employment Relations 
Council of the City of Syracuse, which was 
suspended by our order dated November 28, 
1986, be, and the same is hereby, 
reinstated provided that the continuing 
implementation of its local provisions and 
procedures remains substantially equivalent 
to those governing this Board. 
DATED: December 22, 1986 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
UcjJaz^ ^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#3A-12/22/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PINE BUSH CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C^3130 
PINE BUSH ADMINISTRATORS' ASSOCIATION. 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Pine Bush Administrators' 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Principals, Assistant Principals, 
Directors, Administrative Assistant, 
Supervisor. 
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Excluded: Superintendent, Assistant Superindents 
of Schools, Teachers (including the 
Coordinator and Assistant Coordinator 
of the Gifted and Talented and Assistant 
to the Director of Special Programs), 
clerical, custodial personnel. 
Furthers, IT IS ORDEREDThat Theabove-Trained pub lire employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Pine Bush Administrators' 
Association and enter into a written agreement with such employee 
organization with regard to terms and conditions of employment of 
the employees in the above unit, and shall negotiate collectively 
with such employee organization in the determination of, and 
administration of, grievances of such employees. 
DATED: December 22, 1986 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PORT WASHINGTON WATER DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3097 
LOCAL 808. I.B.T., 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 808. I.B.T. has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All office personnel employed by the Port 
Washington Water District. 
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Excluded: Water Plant Operator (Assistant 
Superintendent, Water Plant Operations), 
Water Plant Operator (Foreman, Field 
Operations), Water Servicer (Cross 
Connection Control Supervisor), Assistant 
Supervisor, Water Plant Operations 
(Supervisor, Water Plant Operations), 
Superintendent, Sr. Account Clerk (Office 
Manage^)^ allr plant^and field employees^,— 
and all other employees, 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Local 808, I.B.T. and enter 
into a written agreement with such employee organization with 
regard to terms and conditions of employment of the employees in 
the above unit, and shall negotiate collectively with such 
employee organization in the determination of, and administration 
of, grievances of such employees. 
DATED: December 22, 1986 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Jerome Lefkowltz, MemWr 
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